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Abstract
In this paper, we test the contribution of foreign management on firms’ com-
petitiveness. We use a novel dataset on the careers of 165,084 managers employed
by 13,106 companies in the United Kingdom in the period 2009-2017. We find that
a domestic manufacturing firm becomes on average between 9% and 12% more
productive after hiring at least one foreign manager. Interestingly, productivity
gains by domestic firms after recruiting foreign managers are similar in magni-
tude to gains after foreign acquisitions as from previous literature. Eventually,
we do not find significant gains by foreign-owned firms hiring foreign managers.
Our identification strategy combines difference-in-difference and matching tech-
niques to challenge reverse causality. We proxy firms’ competitiveness either by
total factor productivity or by technical efficiency derived from stochastic frontier
analyses. Eventually, we argue that limits to the circulation of talents, as for
example in case of a Brexit event, may hamper the allocation of labor productive
resources.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, workers’ mobility has increased dramatically. According to the
Office for National Statistics (2019), the percentage of foreign employment in the United
Kingdom has increased from 3.54% to 11.33% in the period 1997 to 2019. Certainly,
the United Kingdom has been a very attractive destination in the last decades. Such
a boost in immigration has been at the core of the referendum campaign for an exit
from the European Union, i.e. a Brexit event, which could bring to new limits to the
circulation of immigrant workers. Yet, according to ILO (2018), there are about 164
million migrant workers around the world. According to Baldwin (2016; 2019), future
globalization will be shaped by an ever-increasing global mobility of workers who can
also exploit new information technologies to combine work at a distance and a career
across national borders. In this study, we examine how firms’ competitiveness can
be affected by the mobility of a peculiar category of workers, the managers, who are
key contributors to the organization of a firm. As acknowledged by previous studies,
managers’ international mobility facilitates a transfer of knowledge among firms, as for
example in the case of multinational enterprises, between a parent company and its sub-
sidiaries (Cho, 2018). In particular, Mion and Opromolla (2014) and Mion et al. (2016)
observe how knowledge diffusion through managers’ mobility has an impact on a firm’s
export performance, relatively more when the knowledge transfer is market-specific.
The importance of market-specific expertise on the internationalization of a firm is also
studied by Meinen et al. (2018). In this contribution we take a step back if compared to
previous literature, and we study whether foreign managers have an impact on firms’
productivity, which in turn may lead (or not) to enhanced export performance. We
argue that the nexus between management and productivity is a primary one1 that is
worth studying before looking at trade performance. Foreign managers may bring tacit
knowledge that can be beneficial to a firm, whatever its strategy on domestic and for-
eign markets. The same holds in the case of foreign employees where it has been shown
that they can act as a channel of knowledge transfer in high-tech industries (Santacreu-
Vasut and Teshima, 2016). Previous literature identifies two main mechanisms through
which foreign workers can have an impact: i) foreign experts can teach native workers
at a lower cost than if they were self-learnt at home (Markusen and Trofimenko, 2009),
1Seminal works studied how managerial practices are a determinant of productivity differences
across firms and countries (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; 2010; Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom et al.,
2016).
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or ii) the information set provided by high-skilled immigrants can be complementary
to that of native employees (Laursen et al., 2019).
Eventually, we do find that the recruitment of at least one foreign manager for the
first time has a positive and significant impact on firm-level productivity when a firm is
domestic, whereas no significant impact is detected on the productivity of foreign-owned
firms. In fact, the average productivity gains are in a range from 9% to 12% following
recruitment. These gains are similar in magnitude to productivity gains detected after
foreign acquisitions, as from previous literature (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik,
2009). Hence, we argue that the possibility to recruit talents from abroad more gener-
ally allows to source from a wider pool of high skills that may not be present in the firm
or on the domestic market. For our purpose, we take advantage of a novel dataset that
matches the individual careers of 165,084 managers and the financial accounts of firms
in the United Kingdom in the period 2009-2017. From our point of view, the United
Kingdom is a policy-relevant case study since the country is bracing for the impact of
a Brexit event, which will probably reduce the mobility of workers in the next future.
Hence, we assess firms’ competitiveness of UK firms by estimating TFP à la Ackerberg
et al. (2015), and then we make our results robust to a measure of technical efficiency
obtained by stochastic frontier analysis (Kumbhakar et al., 2014). Our identification
strategy encompasses both difference-in-difference estimates on treated firms, i.e. firms
that hired for the first time at least a foreign manager, as well as a propensity score
matching method that first pairs treated firms with nearest untreated neighbors along
different firm-level characteristics. In fact, our identification strategy borrows from the
experience made on testing firm-level productivity premia after acquisitions of domestic
firms by multinational enterprises (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
draws attention to preliminary evidence. Section 3 introduces results on the relationship
between foreign management and firms’ competitiveness. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Data and preliminary evidence
We source data on careers of managers and firms’ financial accounts in the United
Kingdom from Orbis, a commercial database compiled by the Bureau Van Dijk2, which
is a consultancy firm controlled by Moody’s Analytics. The database collects origi-
nal information on management based on individual companies’ filings, including their
roles, dates of recruitment, nationality, gender, and age. Unfortunately, only scant
information is included on managers’ education and wages. For our purpose, we se-
lect managers working at least one year for manufacturing firms active in the United
Kingdom in the period 2009-2017. Interestingly, the UK has a good coverage of man-
agement information if we compare with other countries. This is due to specific filing
requirements asked to both private and public companies by the compilers of the UK
national registry, the Companies House, following the Companies Act in 20063. In
this context, we consider a manager as any individual that participates to a company’s
board, committee or executive department. Therefore, we only exclude from our anal-
ysis advisors and shareholders as they do not participate to the daily administration
of the company. We end up with a sample of 165,084 managers working for 13,106
manufacturing companies located in the United Kingdom. Please note, however, that
any manager in our sample can cover more than one role in the same company, or she
can participate to the management of more than one company at the same time. Since
we have recruitment dates differentiated by both role and company for each individual
manager, we can follow a manager’s career within and across companies. In Appendix
Table 10, we present some details on managers’ levels of responsibility as included in
our sample, where every individual covers at least one of those roles in a company at
some point in our period of analysis. In following analyses, we consider the date of
first hire as the earliest date a manager covered any role in that company. In the end,
the nationality of managers is a crucial variable in our analysis. In our sample, we
find that 16.42 % of managers have a foreign nationality. Table 1 presents the top 10
most common nationalities we detect in our sample. Please note how we adopt here a
2The Orbis database collects and standardizes firms’ financial accounts from around the globe.
Orbis data are increasingly used for firm-level studies on multinational enterprises, see for example
Alviarez et al. (2017), Cravino and Levchenko (2017), Del Prete and Rungi (2017).
3In particular, the main legal concern is that individuals cannot be disqualified by the court from
acting as company directors, and that they cannot be undischarged bankrupts. In a recent past, risk
and compliance companies systematically scrutinized the ensemble of directors from the Companies
House registry to unearth how many were included on international watchlists of individuals considered
at high risk of crime. See, for example, The Times (2008)
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conservative definition of a foreign manager, as for instance a manager that has a dual
citizenship, including also UK, is still considered domestic. In this case, we want to
exclude as much as possible from the set of foreign managers cases when an individual
has never had any experience abroad, because for example she was raised in UK by
foreign parents or because she has migrated relatively earlier in her age to UK. As
largely expected, managers landing in UK companies come from around the globe. We
find in our sample 27,117 foreign managers with 114 different foreign nationalities. The
most represented country is the US, followed by Germany, Japan, and France. Over-
all, we find that 48.26% of foreign managers are citizens of the European Union and
they represent about 7.93% of the total sample. Additionally, in Table 2, we show how
many companies have foreign managers in the period 2009-2017, as well as the number
of companies that hired for the first time at least one foreign manager in the same pe-
riod, further separating between domestic and foreign-owned companies. As expected,
it is more common for foreign companies to hire foreign managers, either because they
interact more often with international markets or because they recruit managers from
headquarters located abroad4. For sake of completeness, in Appendix Table 11, we also
show the top 10 origin country of foreign-owned firms in our sample5.
Table 1: Top 10 nationalities of foreign managers
Nationality No. of managers
United States 7,557
Germany 3,160
Japan 2,751
France 2,383
Ireland 1,425
Netherlands 1,273
Italy 1,068
Sweden 996
South Africa 941
Denmark 782
Note: A foreign manager is a manager with a nationality different from UK. In case of multiple
nationalities, including UK, the individual is considered a domestic manager.
4On the other hand, Ando et al., (2007) show that the experience of a foreign affiliate in a host
country is negatively associated with the recruitment of parent-country nationals.
5The identification of foreign-owned companies follows international standards (OECD, 2005; UNC-
TAD, 2009; UNCTAD, 2016), according to which a subsidiary is controlled after a (direct or indirect)
concentration of voting rights (> 50%).
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Table 2: Companies with foreign managers and new foreign hires in 2009-2017
At least a foreign manager At least a foreign new hire Percentage
All firms 4,607 3,804 82.57 %
of which:
Domestic firms 1,150 826 71.83%
Foreign subsidiaries 3,457 2,978 86.14%
Note: The table presents the number of firms with foreign managers (column 1), as well as the
number of firms that recruited for the first time at least a foreign manager in 2009-2017 (columns
2), expressed also as a percentage (column 3).
2.1 Preliminary evidence on managers and productivity
Researchers across many fields have learnt a great deal about firm-level productivity
since microdata on production activity have become available, and the evidence that
management and productivity are correlated has been piling up over the decades (Syver-
son, 2011). Yet, as far as we know, there is still scant evidence that foreign management
in particular plays a role in this correlation. For the purpose of our analyses, we exploit
two different notions of productivity derived from recent literature. We take firm-level
total factor productivity (TFP) as a baseline after we estimate it following the tech-
nique by Ackerberg et al. (2015), whose summary we report in an Appendix B. In
this framework, TFP is traditionally interpreted as the portion of output growth not
explained by growth in observed inputs. In addition, we estimate firm-level technical
efficiency following stochastic frontier analyses (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). In Appendix
C, we report a summary of the latter empirical approach, according to which any time
a higher level of output is technically attainable for a given set of inputs, or any time
the observed output can be produced using a smaller set of inputs, then a firm has a
relatively inefficient production plan with respect to a frontier.
At this stage, we can already present some first correlations between the presence
of foreign managers and the productivity of a firm. In the first two rows of Table 3, we
present the results of least-squares binary regressions where the dependent variable is
the (log of) TFP and, among regressors, a dummy identifies the presence of at least a
foreign manager in the team without regard to her tenure in the firm. The binary re-
gressions further include firms’ characteristics (firm size, age, capital intensity, and wage
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bill), industry and year fixed effects. The same exercise is repeated on separate subsets
including domestic companies and subsidiaries of foreign firms, separately. Then, on
a third row, we show the result of a similar binary regression performed on the entire
sample, this time identifying with a dummy variable the subset of foreign-owned vis à
vis domestic firms, besides regressors controlling for firm-level characteristics, industry
and year fixed effects. Finally, we performe the exercise comparing the subset of foreign
firms and the subset of domestic firms that employ at least one foreign manager. There
are two points that are worth pointing out here. First, foreign-owned firms show a pos-
itive TFP premium if compared with domestic firms, and this finding is largely in line
with past evidence (Helpman et al. 2004; Tomiura, 2007; Mayer et al. 2008; Arnold
and Javorcik 2009; Bircan, 2009). The second point is a novelty of our study. We
find that domestic companies that have any foreign managers in their team also have
a TFP premium that is similar in size to the premium of foreign over domestic firms.
Visual evidence reported in Figure 1 confirms the previous results. Similar findings are
reported in an Appendix Table 12, where we performed t-tests on TFP distributions
of companies that hired foreign managers in our period of analysis, and of those that
did not. Indeed, at this stage, we can guess that recruiting talents from abroad allows
domestic firms to increase competitiveness, because they may have access to a higher
pool of managerial practices and market experiences, which can in turn benefit also
native workers (Markusen and Trofimenko, 2009; Laursen et al., 2019). Interestingly,
however, any following test that we perform shows that foreign subsidiaries do not show
any TFP advantage from recruiting talents abroad. The ensemble of preliminary evi-
dence in Table 3, Figure 1, and Appendix Table 12 motivates us to investigate further
whether the recruitment of foreign managers has indeed a direct impact on productivity
after challenging hypotheses of reverse causality. That is, we want to rule out that what
we observe after simple correlations is just a phenomenon of cherry-picking, when more
productive firms more likely hire talents from abroad.
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Figure 1: TFP distributions
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Table 3: TFP premia
TFP premia No. of firm per year obs
Domestic firms with vs. without foreign managers 0.045* (0.023) 31,874
Foreign subsidiaries with vs. without foreign managers 0.003 (0.019) 20,026
Foreign subsidiaries vs. domestic firms 0.054** (0.019) 51,900
Foreign subsidiaries vs. domestic firms with foreign managers 0.021 (0.022) 23,801
Note: TFP premia are estimated after OLS binary regressions where the dependent variable is log
of TFP, including firm-level controls, industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
2-digit industry in parenthesis. * and ** stand for p < 0.1 and p < 0.05, respectively.
3 Empirical strategy and Results
3.1 Baseline estimates
We assess the impact of hiring foreign managers on the productivity of a firm through a
quasi-natural experiment. We start by identifying a group of firms that do not have any
foreign managers at the beginning of the period. Hence, we consider a firm as treated
if it recruited for the first time at least one foreign manager in a year of our period of
analysis6 in the period 2009-2017, whereas the control group includes firms that still
do not have any foreign manager at the end of the period. To avoid cases of multiple
treatments in a sequence, we drop from our sample the firm-per-year observations after
a firm hires any foreign manager after the first event. For example, if a firm hired for
the first time at least one foreign manager in 2010, and then it hired again a foreign
manager in 2014, then we keep only the information related to the period from 2009 to
2013. Eventually, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 9,487 firms, of which 1,518
belong to the treatment group and 7,969 firms belong to the control group. At first, we
estimate the following equation 7:
6Please note how our treatment can include the recruitment of one or more foreign manager in a
year. In principle, we could better identify a treated firm as a firm that hired the first foreign manager,
since we have exact recruitment dates. However, this is not allowed by the firm-level outcome data,
as TFPs are based on financial accounts collected on a yearly basis, when multiple recruitments can
occur. In this case, we prefer keeping in the treated group also firms that hired more than once in
a single year, to avoid a sample selection bias induced by the exclusion of most active firms on job
markets.
7For a similar exercise performed to test firm-level productivity after foreign acquisitions, please
see Bircan (2019).
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yijt = β0 + β1Ti × Postt + β′Xit + γj + δt +
∑
k
ηk × δt + εijt (1)
where yijt is the (log of) TFP of firm i in industry j and in year t, Ti is the treatment,
i.e. the recruitment of at least one foreign manager and Postt is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the period follows the recruitment. Xit includes firm-level characteristics
like firm size, firm age, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity, and foreign
subsidiary status. γj and δt are 2-digit industry and year fixed effects, respectively.
Since foreign managers may target specific plants based on some observed or unobserved
characteristics, we may have an issue of self-selection. In this case, we include the term∑
k ηk × δt that represents a set of time trends controlling for the pre-recruitment age
and size of the firm, as well as a set of industry fixed effects at the 4-digit level. In this
term, we categorize firm age according to the number of years of life in the following way:
[0,4], [5,9], [10,14], and 15+ years. On the other hand, we categorize firm size according
to the number of employees in the following way: [0,9], [10,19], [20,49], [50,249], and
250+ employees. Results are reported in Table 4, where we consider only the subset
of treated firms, hence β1 measures TFP changes occurring within treated firms, after
hiring at least one foreign manager. The same exercise is repeated for both domestic and
foreign-owned firms, separately. In column 1 of Table 4, we find that there is a significant
increase of 12.07% on TFP for domestic firms (log units 0.114; e0.114 = 1.1207) when
they hire at least one foreign manager. The impact is slightly smaller (11.18%; log units
0.106; e0.106 = 1.1118) when we control for industry-per-year fixed effects in column 2
of the same table. There are many skills that a talent from abroad can provide to a
domestic firm to boost productivity. More in general, we can argue that a newly-hired
high-skilled immigrant can teach to native workers what the latter could otherwise find
difficult to learn by themselves (Markusen and Trofimenko, 2009), or she can bring skills
that are just complementary to the ones that are already present in the team of the
recruiting firm (Laursen et al., 2019). Apparently, there is no significant change in the
productivity of foreign-owned subsidiaries after they hire at least one foreign manager.
In this case, it is possible that the most productivity spillovers already occurred at
the moment of an acquisition by a multinational enterprise (Bircan, 2019; Arnold and
Javorcik, 2009).
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Table 4: Foreign managers and TFP - baseline estimates
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.013 0.015
(0.020) (0.021)
R2 0.940 0.942
No. of obs. 3,957 3,957
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.114*** 0.106**
(0.038) (0.040)
R2 0.922 0.926
No. of obs. 1,670 1,670
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment -0.042 -0.044
(0.026) (0.028)
R2 0.961 0.964
No. of obs. 2,287 2,287
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes
4-digit Industry, age, size trends Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes
Year effects Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq. (1) on treated firms only, i.e. firms that hired at
least one foreign manager for the first time in the period of analysis. Coefficients are in log units.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 2-digit industry. Firm-level controls include age,
employment, capital intensity, average wages, skill intensity and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary
status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
3.2 Propensity-score matching and Diff-in-Diff
Even though, in the previous exercise, we control for pre-recruitment industry trends
and several covariates, part of the effect on productivity after the recruitment can still
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be due to the specific ability of a firm to target foreign talents. Therefore, in this Section,
we perform an exercise that further challenges the direction of causality. We apply a
matching procedure to pair firms included in the treatment group with their peers in the
control group that share similar characteristics. In particular, we implement a one-to-
one nearest neighbour matching method performed within the same 2-digit industry and
year cell. All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged one year to reflect the pre-
treatment period. The explanatory variables are chosen following previous literature
that studied the impact of foreign acquisitions (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Bircan,
2019), since we can assume that the recruitment of foreign managers is endogenous
to a similar set of observable firms’ characteristics: technological progress, firm age,
firm size, the average composition of employment, capital intensity, skill intensity, and
ownership status. Table 5 presents the result of the probit model.
Table 5: Probit estimates - Predicting the recruitment of foreign managers
Dep variable: Hire=1 or 0
TFPt−1 0.131 Age2t−1 -0.013
(0.113) (0.013)
TFPt−1× Aget−1 -0.014 Capital intensityt−1 0.305**
(0.012) (0.125)
Employmentt−1 -0.176 Capital intensityt−1 × Aget−1 -0.031**
(0.143) (0.014)
Employmentt−1× Aget−1 0.042*** Skill intensityt−1 1.051***
(0.016) (0.190)
Average wagest−1 0.109** Skill intensity2t−1 -0.202***
(0.048) (0.060)
Aget−1 0.187 Foreign subsidiary 1.220***
(0.231) (0.042)
Pseudo R2 0.194
No. of obs. 26,783
Note: All variables are in logs except capital intensity, skill intensity and foreign subsidiary status.
Standard errors clustered by 2-digit industry in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p <
0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
The results indicate that a capital-intensive firm with a higher wage bill more likely
hires a foreign manager. Moreover, in line with descriptive statistics, foreign managers
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preferably work for foreign-owned companies. On the other hand, skill intensity has an
inverted U-shape. Hence, the odds of hiring a foreign manager increase when this ratio is
growing but up to a point, when it starts dropping. The age of the firm has a significant
correlation with new hires of foreign managers only when we control for its interaction
with employment as a proxy for firm size, and for capital intensity. Finally, to assess
how well the propensity score matching performs in our case, we implement a balancing
test. That is, we compare the averages of all the time-variant covariates assigned to
the matching procedure. Table 6 shows the averages of the treatment and the control
group, respectively, for all 505 matched pairs of companies. Eventually, we find that
there is no ex-post statistically significant difference along the set of variables that we
included for the matching. Having ensured that there is a good match among pairs, we
proceed to diff-in-diff estimates of Eq. (1) that we report in Table 7. It is immediately
evident how coefficients are similar to those of Table 4, where we considered only the
subset of treated firms. Once again, when we focus on the case of domestic companies
(Panel B), we find that TFP arises after hiring foreign managers for the first time. In
this case, the TFP growth rate is 10.30% (log units 0.098, e0.098 = 1.1030) and 9.97%
(log units 0.095; e0.095 = 1.0997), respectively. In line with both descriptive statistics
and previous estimates, foreign subsidiaries do not benefit from any significant increase
in TFP after hiring foreign managers. In fact, we argue, it is possible that main TFP
gains already occurred at the moment the firm was acquired from foreign headquarters,
i.e. after a firm first got in touch with a large pool of international experiences.
Table 6: Balancing test on the nearest-neighbour matching procedure
Average treated Average control t-test p-value
TFPt−1 2.588 2.525 0.62 0.537
Employmentt−1 4.615 4.694 -1.06 0.292
Average wagest−1 5.835 5.804 1.13 0.260
Aget−1 8.875 8.948 -1.17 0.241
Capital intensityt−1 5.300 5.259 0.50 0.619
Skill intensityt−1 0.082 0.070 1.07 0.287
Note: The table reports averages and t-tests for variables used in previous probit estimates after
constructing the nearest-neighbour control group.
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Table 7: Foreign managers and TFP - DID on the matched sample
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: (log) TFP (log) TFP
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.036 0.038
(0.023) (0.024)
R2 0.942 0.944
No. of obs. 6,183 6,183
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.098*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.028)
R2 0.927 0.930
No. of obs. 2,962 2,962
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment -0.018 -0.016
(0.033) (0.034)
R2 0.961 0.963
No. of obs. 3,221 3,221
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes
4-digit Industry, age, size trends Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes
Year effects Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq. (1) for the matched sample. Standard errors clustered at
the 2-digit industry level in parentheses. Coefficients in log units. Firm-level controls include age,
employment, capital intensity, average wage bill, skill intensity and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary
status. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
3.3 Robustness check: technical efficiency
In this section, we validate our results by performing the same empirical exercises using
technical efficiency from stochastic frontier analyses as an alternative proxy for firms’
competitiveness. Following this framework, we define a production plan as technically
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inefficient when a higher level of output is attainable for a given set of inputs, or when
the observed output can be produced using a smaller set of inputs (Kumbhakar et al.,
2015). This is a different perspective, where the managerial decision-making process has
been already considered as a crucial determinant of technical efficiency (see for example
Wilson et al., 2001). In Appendix C, we provide details on the estimation of firm-level
technical efficiencies, which could be further disaggregated into a time-invariant and a
time-variant component. In Appendix Figure 2, we also report the evolution over time
of both components. In our case, we consider the overall technical efficiency (OTE) as
the measure of firm-level competitiveness8. By construction, the value of OTE ranges
between zero and one, and it indicates how close the firm is to the production frontier. In
this context, we test the hypothesis that foreign managers increase the ability of a firm
to achieve a production level closer to its empirical frontier. Following the same steps of
previous paragraphs, we first estimate the change before and after the treatment for the
sample of treated firms only. Thereafter, we perform a diff-in-diff analysis on a matched
sample, controlling for the same firm-level characteristics included in Table 5. Table 8
presents the results for the treated firms only, where patterns are similar but weakly
or not at all significant. Specifically, when we consider the case of domestic companies,
we still find a weakly positive coefficient in the first column. Statistical significance
is lost when we include industry-per-year fixed effects, hence challenging the firm-level
outcome variation to check for idiosyncratic market shocks. Since we cannot exclude
that the recruitment of foreign managers is still endogenous to a set of observable firms’
characteristics, we apply once again the matching technique described in the previous
section. Result reported in (Table 9) show that domestic firms increase their technical
efficiency by 0.5% after the recruitment of foreign management. Similarly to previous
estimates, we cannot say that foreign subsidiaries benefit from the recruitment of foreign
management.
8OTE is the product of persistent (time-invariant) and residual (time-variant) technical efficiency.
See also Manevska-Tasevska et al. (2017), who show that different management practices may affect
each component of technical efficiency in a different way. However, in our case we do not find a
significant difference in trends over time.
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Table 8: Foreign managers and technical efficiency - Baseline estimates
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: OTE OTE
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.080 0.151
No. of obs. 3,955 3,955
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.008* 0.008
(0.004) (0.005)
R2 0.114 0.236
No. of obs. 1,670 1,670
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment -0.005* -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
R2 0.093 0.223
No. of obs. 2,285 2,285
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes
4-digit Industry, age, size trends Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes
Year effects Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq. (1) on treated firms only. Standard errors clustered by
2-digit industries in parentheses. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital intensity,
average wage bill, skill intensity and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and *** stand
for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table 9: Foreign managers and technical efficiency - DID on the matched sample
(1) (2)
Dep. variable: OTE OTE
Panel A: All firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.082 0.144
No. of obs. 6,181 6,181
Panel B: Domestic firms
Hired× Post-recruitment 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.096 0.176
No. of obs. 2,962 2,962
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries
Hired× Post-recruitment -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.099 0.179
No. of obs. 3,219 3,219
Panels A, B and C:
Firm controls Yes Yes
4-digit Industry, age, size trends Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes
Year effects Yes
Industry × Year effects Yes
Note: The table reports estimation results of Eq. (1). The sample consists of firms that hired
at least one foreign manager and their matched controls. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-
digit industry level and given in parentheses. Firm-level controls include age, employment, capital
intensity, average wages, skill intensity and, for Panel A, foreign subsidiary status. *, ** and ***
stand for p < 0.1, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
4 Conclusion
As far as we know, no previous work has addressed the primary relationship between
foreign management and firm-level productivity. In the case of the United Kingdom,
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we find that domestic manufacturing firms largely benefit from hiring foreign managers.
We find that their productivity increase in a range between 9% and 12% after recruiting.
In fact, recruiting talents from abroad can allow firms to have access to a wider pool of
skills than the ones available on the domestic market. After recruitment, foreign man-
agers can share better managerial practices and different market experiences, or their
skills can just be complementary to the ones by the native workers. Interestingly, we
detect no significant gains by foreign-owned firms hiring for the first time foreign man-
agers. In this case, we argue that productivity spillovers could already have occurred
after the acquisition by foreign headquarters, when local subsidiaries become part of
a multinational enterprise. More in general, our findings suggest that the recruitment
of managerial talents from abroad can be a valid alternative to exploit international
technological spillovers. In this perspective, we can argue that the introduction of bar-
riers to the circulation of talents, as for example after a Brexit event, could hamper the
competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Graphs
Table 10: Board, committee or department in which managers’ belong
Title No. of managers
Senior management 113,906
Board of Directors 99,163
Operations & Production & Manufacturing 11,322
Sales & Retail 8,923
Finance & Accounting 6,458
Administration department 4,885
Human Resources (HR) 4,008
Information Technology (IT) & Information Systems (IS) 3,367
Purchasing & Procurement 3,261
Research & Development / Engineering 3,091
Marketing & Advertising 2,816
Health & Safety 680
Branch Office 271
Legal/Compliance department 128
Product/Project/Market Management 126
Executive Committee 119
Audit Committee 61
Nomination Committee 58
Remuneration/Compensation Committee 53
Corporate Governance Committee 35
Supervisory Board 17
Risk Committee 11
Safety Committee 7
Executive Board 5
Environment Committee 4
Public & Government Affairs 4
Quality Assurance 4
Ethics Committee 3
Others & Unspecified 18,811
Note: The table reports roles of managers as present from our sample. Any manager can cover
more than one role in the same company, or she can participate to the management of more than
one company at the same time. We exclude from original sources only shareholders and advisors
without any role in the daily management of the firm. Please note how names of roles are not
standard across firms, as they may follow the specific responsibilities attributed to individuals
autonomously within firms.
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Table 11: Top 10 origin countries of foreign-owned firms
Nationality No. of companies
United States 1,321
Germany 394
Japan 279
France 262
Sweden 183
Switzerland 157
Ireland 155
Netherlands 146
Italy 105
Luxembourg 96
Note: We define a foreign-owned firm following international standards ((OECD, 2005; UNCTAD,
2009; UNCTAD, 2016), according to which a subsidiary is controlled after a (direct or indirect)
concentration of voting rights (> 50%).
Table 12: T-tests on TFP distributions for firms with and without foreign managers
Average value of TFP With Without With Without Total
foreign managers foreign managers new foreign managers new foreign managers
All firms 2.638*** 2.468*** 2.658*** 2.516*** 2.528
(0.013) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008) (0.008)
Domestic firms 2.656*** 2.432*** 2.607** 2.455** 2.458
(0.027) (0.010) (0.068) (0.009) (0.009)
Foreign subsidiaries 2.634 2.670 2.667 2.637 2.643
(0.015) (0.025) (0.031) (0.014) (0.013)
Note: Columns (2) and (3) show the TFP averages of firms with and without foreign managers,
respectively. Columns (4) and (5) show the TFP averages of firms with and without new foreign
recruits in 2009-2017. The last column pools all firms together. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
We test the null hypotheses that averages are equal after a t-test. *, ** and *** stand for p < 0.1,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table 13: OTE premia
OTE premia No. of firm per year obs
Domestic firms with vs. without foreign managers 0.001* (0.001) 31,830
Foreign subsidiaries with vs. without foreign managers -0.001 (0.001) 20,015
Foreign subsidiaries vs. domestic firms 0.001 (0.001) 51,845
Foreign subsidiaries vs. domestic firms with foreign managers -0.001 (0.001) 23,788
Note: OTE premia are estimated after OLS binary regressions, where the dependent variable is
OTE, including firm-level controls, industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
2-digit industry in parentheses. * and ** stand for p < 0.1 and p < 0.05.
Figure 2: Firm-level components of technical efficiency in the period 2009-2017
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the average level of each component of firm-level technical
efficiency over time: Residual Technical Efficiency (RTE), Persistent Technical Efficiency (PTE)
and Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) as they are estimated by the model of Kumbhakar et al.,
(2014).
21
Appendix B: Total Factor Productivity à la Ackerberg, Caves
and Frazer (2015)
The major identification problem in estimating a firm-level production function is that
input choices can depend on shocks unobserved by the econometrician at the end of the
period, when firms’ financial accounts typically become available. Therefore, an endo-
geneity problem can arise such that the observed combination of production factors is
simultaneous to the possibly unobserved shocks, hence OLS estimates are inconsistent.
In this context, the model of Ackerberg et al. (2015) follows on previous efforts by Ol-
ley & Pakes (1996), Levinsohn & Perin (2003), and Woolridge (2009). Here, we briefly
summarize the empirical framework. Let us start considering the following production
function:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ωit + εit (2)
where yit is the log of output (or value added), kit is the log of capital stock, lit is
the log of labour input, ωit is the unobserved productivity component and εit is the
error term of firm i at time t. The model imposes the following assumptions:
• Assumption 1: The firm’s information set Iit includes current and past produc-
tivity shocks {ωiτ}tτ=0 but does not include future productivity shocks {ωiτ}∞τ=t+1.
The transitory shocks εit satisfy E[εit|Iit] = 0.
• Assumption 2: Productivity shocks evolve according to a First Order Markov
Distribution
p(ωit+1|Iit) = p(ωit+1|ωit)
with a distribution that is known to firms and stochastically increasing in ωit.
• Assumption 3: Firms accumulate capital according to
kit = κ(kit−1, iit−1)
where investment iit−1 is chosen at t−1. Labour input may potentially be dynamic
and is chosen at period t, t− 1 or t− b (0 < b < 1).
• Assumption 4: The intermediate input demand for a firm is given by
mit = f(kit, lit, ωit) (3)
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• Assumption 5: f(kit, lit, ωit) is strictly increasing in ωit.
Given the above assumptions, from Eq. (3) we have ωit = f−1(kit, lit,mit). Substi-
tuting in the production function, we have
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + f
−1(kit, lit,mit) + εit = Φt(kit, lit,mit) + εit (4)
which leads to the following first stage moment condition:
E[εit|Iit] = yit − Φt(kit, lit,mit) = 0 (5)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that we can decompose ωit into its conditional expecta-
tion at time t− 1, and an innovation term, that is,
ωit = E[ωit|Iit−1] + ξit = E[ωit|ωt−1] + ξit = g(ωit−1) + ξit
where E[ξit|Iit−1] = 0.
So we obtain the estimated values Φˆt(kit, lit,mit) using the following second stage
conditional moment:
E[ξit + εit|Iit−1]
= E[yit − β0 − βkkit − βllit − g(Φt−1(kit−1, lit−1,mit−1)− β0 − βkkit−1 − βllit−1)|Iit−1]
= 0
(6)
Now, consider a model where ωit = ρωit−1 + ξit. Suppose that the first stage is
performed by an OLS regression of yit on a high-order polynomial in (kit, lit,mit) to
obtain Φˆt(kit, lit,mit). If labour is assumed to be chosen after time t−1, then a natural
set of four second stage moment conditions to estimate β0, βk, βl and ρ is
E [yit − β0 − βkkit − βllit − ρ · (Φt−1(kt−1, lt−1,mt−1)− β0 − βkkit−1 − βllit−1))
⊗

1
kit
lit−1
Φt−1(kit−1, lit−1,mit−1)

 = 0
(7)
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Appendix C: Technical efficiency à la Kumbhakar, Lien and
Hardaker (2014)
Kumbhakar et al. (2014) introduce one of the most recent models for estimating tech-
nical efficiency applying stochastic frontier analysis. Thanks to this approach, it is pos-
sible to split the error term of a firm-level production function into four components in
order to consider different factors affecting output9: i) time-invariant firms’ heterogene-
ity; ii) short-run time-varying (or residual) inefficiency; iii) persistent or time-invariant
inefficiency; iv) random shocks. Hence, the setup of the model is the following:
yit = αo + f(xit; β) + µi + vit − ηi − uit (8)
where yit is the output of firm i at time t, f(xit; β) is a translog production function,
µi are firm effects, vit is the noise and finally, ηi > 0 and uit > 0 are the time-invariant
and time-variant inefficiency components respectively. This model is one of the most
innovative in the literature of stochastic frontier analysis. The main reason is the
fact that it is able to capture firm effects, time invariant inefficiency and time-varying
inefficiency all in the same model, in contrast with previous ones that were able to
capture one or two of these components only.
The estimation of Eq. (8) has been applied in a 3-step procedure. At first, we
rewrite the model in the following way:
yit = α
∗
0 + f(xit; β) + αi + εit (9)
where
α∗0 = α0 − E(ηi)− E(uit) (10)
αi = µi − ηi + E(uit) (11)
εit = vit − uit + E(uit) (12)
The first step is to estimate βˆ by using random-effects panel regression to obtain
estimates of αi and εit, namely αˆi and εˆit. The second step is to estimate the time-
varying inefficiency component uit. To do so, we use the predicted value εˆit obtained
9See also Kumbhakar et al. (2015) for a detailed review of stochastic frontier models for estimating
technical efficiency.
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in the first step. Under the assumption that vit is i.i.d. N(0, σ2v) and uit is N+(0, σ2u),
we estimate uit from Eq. (12). The third step is to estimate ηi from Eq. (11). Under
the assumption that µi is i.i.d. N(0, σ2µ), ηi is i.i.d. N+(0, σ2η) we obtain estimates for
the persistent technical inefficiency components ηi.
Finally, the residual and persistent technical efficiency are estimated respectively
from the following equations:
RTE = exp(−uit|εit)
PTE = exp(−ηi)
The overal technical efficiency is obtained by
OTE = PTE× RTE (13)
Finally, we are able to depict the mean values of RTE, PTE and OTE over time.
See Appendix Figure 2.
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